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FULL FAITH AND CREDIT

THE LAWYER'S CLAUSE

BY ROBERT E. CHILDS'
PART 1
The Necessity for Revising Federal Legislation Under the Full
Faith and Credit Clause
The second and last federal legislation under the full faith
and credit clause i was enacted m 1804--143 years ago. This
lack of attention was commented upon recently by Mr. Justice

Jackson.
"This clause is relatively neglected in legal literature. It did not have the advantage of early and luninous exposition by Marshall. No scholar has thought it
worthy of a book. Text writers have usually noticed it
only as a subsidiary consideration in the law of conflicts or as a phase of constitutional law too obvious to
require much exploration. Changing conditions of a
century and a half have brought forth no new legislative implementation. The practicing lawyers often
neglect to raise questions under it, and judges not mfrequently decide cases to which it would apply without
mention of it."'

This lament is fully justified, when we review the recorded
history of this clause, the few opimons written under its
analogous predecessor in the Articles of the Confederation, and
the scant discussion of full faith and credit problems m our
federal Congress. The purpose of this, the first in a series of
papers to be published concerning the full faith and credit
clause, 3 is to show how the scant deliberation given this ques*B. S., J. D., Northwestern University- Graduate Student, Summer, 1940, Northwestern University Law School; Graduate Student,
1946 and summer of 1947, University of Michigan Law School.
Private practice at Hammond, Indiana, 1939-1944. U. S. Navy,
1944-1946. 1946-1947, Associate Professor of Law, Wayne University,
Detroit, Michigan. 1943-44, Secretary of Hammond, Indiana, Bar
Association; 1944, Secretary of and Member of Grievance Committee, Hammond, Indiana, Bar Association.

'U. S. CONST. ART. IV SEC. 1.

Jackson, Full Faith and CTedit: The Lawyer's Clause of the
Constitution (1945) 45 COL. L. REV. 1.
The series has these tentative chapter titles:
II. State Legislation Concerning Full Faith and Credit.
IIl. The Checks and Balances Imposed Upon the Lawyers'
Clause By Other Constitutional Provisions.
IV
Due Process In Particular and Full Faith and Credit:
Herein of Jurisdiction, Service of Process, The Doctrine
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tion by our statesmen has created some very apparent problems, has required supplementary state legislation, and that the
time is ripe for a thorough federal and state overhauling of our
statutes on this topic. Our courts need more decisive standards
than are now in force. 4 While the historical approach here
presented may seem at times to be too detailed and laborious,
it is herein that we find the foundation for many of the presentday puzzling and nconsistent decisions.
This is not a recent problem, it existed before we became a nation.5 It was considered by the colonists prior to the
adoption of the Articles of Confederation, when thle American
Colonies owed allegiance to the Crown of England. Until that
time there existed no specific legal rights or duties among the
of Forum Non Conveniens and Extra-Territorial Effect
of Legislation.
V Pleading and Evidence Under Full Faith and Credit
Provisions.
VI. The Public Policy of the Forum and Full Faith and
Credit.
VII. Specific Judgments as Bases of Causes of Action and
Defenses Under Full Faith and Credit.
VIII. The Technique of Acquiring Federal Jurisdiction Under
Full Faith and Credit Problems.
IX. Proposed Solutions.
X. A Proposed Model State and Federal Act. The writer
wishes to acknowledge his great indebtedness to Hessel
E. Yntema, Professor of Law, University of Michigan
Law School, and to Lewis M. Simes, Floyd R. Mechem
University Professor of Law, University of Michigan
Law School, for their cooperation
and aid in
undertaking and continuing this study, which is made
as a partial fulfillment of the requirements for the
LL.M. and S.J.D. degrees at the University of Michigan
Law School. Errors and omissions are solely my liability.
It is not proper to conclude that legislation alone will solve all
the full faith and credit problems. Certainly it can remedy some of
the more apparent defects which are pointed out in this paper.
'Previous discussions of the historical development of the full
faith and credit clause, listed in chronological order, and which from
necessity, the writer has to duplicate to a certain extent, are: Costigan, The History of the Adoption of Section I of Article IV of the
United States Constitution and A Consideration of the Effect on
Judgments of that Section and of Federal Legislation (1904) 4 COL.
L. REv. 470; Cook, The Powers of Congress Under the Full Faith and
Credit Clause (1918) 28 YALE L. J.-421, Yntema, The Enforcement
of Foreign Judgments in Anglo-American Law (1933) 33 Mica. L.
REv. 1129; Ross, Full Faith and Credit in a FederalSystem (1936) 20
MiwN,. L. REV. 140; Radin, The Authenticated Full Faith and Credit
Clause: Its History (1944) 39 ILL. L. REV. 1.
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American colonies aside from those imposed as a part of
the colonial policy of the motherland and by International Law.
Because of tins independence, each from the other, a colony
could consider the acts of another colony as the acts of a
foreign government. Nevertheless each had similar economic
and political 'interests. One such interest was the protection
of their own creditors. To aid their respective residents to
collect from absconding debtors, most of them passed foreign
attachment acts. And that despite their hatred for the English, foreign attachment acts which prevented a goodly number of these same colonists from leaving England with unpaid
for goods and unreturned borrowed funds. Also the Colonists
were not averse to opening their courts to non-resident creditors
who were seeking judicial aid in collecting their just dues from
a resident debtor. A citizen of South Carolina could bring suit
against a Delaware resident in the courts of the latter. The
only requirement was that the non-resident plaintiff "give
Security for the Costs and Charges that may accrue by such
Writ or Action, which said security shall be by a substautial
inhabitant of that County where such, action is commenced." 0
This requirement has a modern counterpart in our present-day
codes, familiarly known as "posting a non-resident cost bond.'"
English creditors could use the colonial courts. If D, a
0From "An Act obliging all non-residenters within this Government to give Security to the Prothonotaries of these Counties, before
any Writ can issue from their said Offices for the Payment of the
Costs." Laws of the Government of New Castle, Kent and Sussex
Upon Delaware. Published by order of the Assembly. Printed and
Sold by B. Franklin at the New Printing-Office, in Market Street,
MDCCXLI.
The second paragraph of the act of the Province of Maryland,
op. cit. fn. 14, makes a similar requirement of non-resident plaintiffs.
I1Mich. Stat. Ann., sec. 27.738, Vol. 20, p. 663: "On motion of the
defendant, all plaintiffs who are non-residents of the State of
Michigan
may be required to furnish sufficient surety or sureties, to be approved by the clerk of the court, and who shall justify
in double the amount of security ordered, for all such costs as may
be awarded to the defendant, and such sureties shall be liable for all
costs awarded either in the court of original jurisdiction, or in any
"
appellate court.
Kentucky makes no distinction between non-resident and resident plaintiffs: "Each circuit clerk shall, when each original action
commencing with original process in his respective court is filed,
collect five dollars and apply it as a credit on the clerk's fees accruing in the action." Kentucky Rev Stats., 1946, sec. 64.030, p. 426.
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resident of Mlassachusetts, was indebted to P, a resident of
England, P could file suit in the courts of Massachusetts. However, had P found D in England so that personal service of
summons could have been had on D, and P received a judgment in an English. court of record, that judgment wonid not
necessarily be the basis of P's aution in iassachusetts against
D, assuming D had left England without satisfying the judgment. I have found no English statutes requiring the colomal
courts to enforce judgments obtained in English courts against
American Coloists.8 In fact, P would probably find that his
valid English judgment of record would be treated m the
colonial courts as though it -were the judgment of a court of a
totally foreign government, and not that of a court of the
mother country 9
A sinilar situation existed if P had originally obtained a
judgment in South Carolina against D, a resident of South
Carolina. Assume D left for Massachusetts without paying the
South Carolina judgment. P would have Ins judgment treated
by the courts of Massacbusetts as though it were the judgment
of a court of a foreign country and not the judgment o a
'None is listed in the "Chronological Table and Index of the
Statutes, Thirty-Third Edition. To the End of the Session 7 & 8 Geo.

5 (1917-8)." The Chronological table was checked from 1500 to 1790.
"With one exception-a relaxed method of proving plaintiff's

case-m-chief, as provided for by Stat. 5 Geo. II (1731-3), C. 7. "An
Act for the more easy recovery of debts in his Majesty's plantations
and colonies in America:" "
in any action or suit
to be
brought in any court of law or equity in any of the said plantations,
for or relating to any debt or account, wherein any person residing
in Great Britain shall be a party it shall and may be lawful to and
for the plaintiff or defendant, and also to and for any witness to be
examined or made use of in such action or suit, to verify or prove

any matter or thing by affidavit or affidavits in writing upon oath
made before any mayor or other chief magistrate of the city,
, and every affidavit
borough or town corporate in Great Britain
or affirmation so made, certified, and transmitted, shall in all such
actions and suits be allowed to be of the same force and effect, as if
the person or persons making the same upon oath or solemn affirmation as aforesaid, had appeared and sworn or affirmed the matters
contained in such affidavit or affirmation viva voce in open court, or
upon a commission issued for the examination of witnesses, or of
"
any party in such action or suit respectively;
It appears that cross-examination is not necessary; this differs
from the usual form of interrogatories propounded to an adverse
party and to be answered in writing under oath. Nor is it a deposition as we now know it. The third section of the act provides the one
safeguard: false swearing amounts to willful and corrupt perjury
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court of a sister colony Likewise there were no English statutes requiring that the courts of the colonies of England m the
Americas enforce the judgments of another colonial court. 10
Of the thirteen colonies, at least three'1 felt that they
should not serve as sanctuaries for fleeing colonial judgment
debtors. Connecticut, Maryland and Massachusetts Bay expanded their common law action of debt on a domestic judgment
to include the judgments of courts of certain other jurisdictions.
Connecticut was the first colony so to legislate. Prior to
1650, it enacted
"Verdicts. That loue and peace may continue and

Ordered,
flourish in these confoederated colonyes.
that any verdict or sentence of any court within the

colonyes, presented under authentique testimony, shall
haue a due respect in the severall courtes of this jurisdiction, where there may bee occasion to make use
thereof, and shall be accounted good euidence for the
party, until better euidence or other just cause appeare
to alter or make the same voide: And that in such
case the issueing of the cause in question bee respited
for some conveneint time, that the coute may bee aduised with, where the verdict or sentence first passed.
Provided.
That this order shall be accounted valid
and improued only for the aduantage of such as hue
within some of the confoederated colonyes; and where
the verdicts in the courts of this colony may receiue
reciprocall respect by a like order
established by the
generall courte of that colonye.' 'U
The provincial courts were bound by the findings of a provmcial admiralty court. See, 9 Pickering Stat. at L., pp. 428-9, setting
forth 8 Win. III, C. XXII, "An act for preventing frauds, and regulating abuses in the plantation trade." Sec. II of that act provided
that all bottoms used for import-export trade m the colomes be of
English or Irish construction; if not, there may be "condemnation
thereof in one of the courts of admiralty in England, Ireland, or the
said colonies or plantations." However, except for the specific cause
of action created by the use of other than English or Irish built
ships, that this effect ordinarily was given to the decisions of admiralty courts was well known to the colonial lawyers, even without
this statute. See Jenkins v Putnam, op. cit., note 21.
" Professor Max Radin, 39 Ill. L. Rev 1, p. 18, states: "Story says
that there were several such statutes (citing 2 Story, Commentaries
on the Constitution of the United States, 5th ed., 1891, M. M. Bigelow,
edit. sec. 1307, p. 188) I have been able to find only that of Massachusetts."
Story simply cited the case of Bissel v Briggs, 9 Mass. 461, 6 Am.
Dec. 88 (1813) which referred to the Massachusetts Bay Act of 14
Geo. III, Ch. II, hereinafter discussed in this paper. Costigan, supra,
note 1 and Mr. Justice Gray in Hilton v Guyot, 159 U. S. 113, 181
(1895), likewise make the same statement as did Story.
"Connecticut, Acts and Laws, 1650. This appears to be a codification of the Acts. The effective date of this particular statute is not
stated.
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An examination of this Connecticut statute presents many
requirements which are reiterated in decisions under the wording of the full faith and credit clause of our present Constitution. The statute limited the enforcement of judgments to those
of "any court within the colonies"--the full faith and credit
clause is limited to the enforcement of the "public acts, records
and judicial proceedings of every other state", those of foreign
countries are clearly excluded. Modern day decisions, attempting to distinguish between "prima facie" and "conclusive"
effect of judgments are modern restatements of the Connecticut
statute's "a verdict is good evidence until better evidence
or other just cause appear to alter or make the same voide."
Moreover, Connecticut demanded reciprocity it permitted
the verdict of the courts of the other colonies to be good evidence provided that the colony whose verdict was presented
would consider the verdict of a Connecticut court to be good
evidence. Such reciprocity is still required by some state statutes. 13 Note also the requirement that the verdict be "presented under authentique testimony", in later federal and state
statutes, much is made of the "authentication" of the records
of other states.
June 3rd, 1715, the Province of Maryland passed the
following .14
"PA. STAT. ANN., (PURDON) Title 42, Sec. 311, p. 66; "Justices of
the Peace of this state have jurisdiction in actions of debt, on demands not exceeding $100., founded on judgment or judgments oi
any justice of the peace of any adjoining state, where a similar
jurisdiction is given to justices by the laws of such state:
Code of Laws of South Carolina, 1942, sec. 726, p. 540: "No testimonial, probate, certificate, or other instrument under the seal of
any foreign court of law, notary public, or other magistrate or person qualified and empowered to give the same, shall be received in
the courts of the State as evidence of any debt or demand owing by
any person or persons resident within the limits of this State: provided, nevertheless, that if it shall appear to the court that the testimonials, probates, certificates, or other instruments of writing for
the purposes aforesaid, which have been, or shall be hereafter, issued from any of the courts of this state, or by any of the officers
thereof authorized and empowered to give the same, are received
and allowed as evidence in the courts of such foreign country, then
such instruments of writing shall be received in evidence in the
courts of this State."
"Acts of Assembly Passed in the Province of Maryland From
1692 to 1715. Printed by J. Baskett, Printer to the King's Most Excellent Majesty MDCCXXIII, London.
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"No. 85. An Act, Providing What Shall be Good
Evidence to prove Foreign and other Debts; and to
Prevent Vexation and unnecessary suits at Law, and
Pleading Discounts in Bar.
That all debts or records, whether by judgment, recognizance, deed inrolled, and upon record, the exemplification thereof, under the seal of the courts where the
said judgment was given, or was recorded, shall be
sufficient evidence to prove the same.
"

Here is an expanded action of debt-its scope broadened
from the familiar common law action of debt on a judgment of
a Maryland court to include debt on a judgment of a foreign
court. Inherent is the idea that to enforce the foreign judgment an action first must be brought on the judgment itself,
that the foreign judgment is not executed. The mode of proving
the judgment is given in greater detail than the Connecticut
act it must be "exemplified under the seal of the court where
the judgment was given."
Eliminated is Connecticut's requirement of reciprocity, no effect is prescribed, and nothing
is stated as to what types of foreign judgments can be sufficient
evidence. It does not appear to be limited to the judgments of
colonial courts and is unique in that respect.
The best known of the three Colonial Acts was passed by
the Province of Massachusetts Bay on March 4, 1774, which
an part, reads .-5
"An Act to Enable Persons to Bring Forward and
Maintain Actions of Debt in the Executive Courts
Within This Province, Upon Judgments Recovered in
the Neighbouring Governments, and Upon Judgments
Recovered Before Justices of the Peace in This
Province.
"Sec. 1.
it shall and may be lawful for such
creditor or creditors who have so recovered or shall
hereafter recover a judgment or judgments as aforesaid, to bring forward, support and maintain an action
or actions of debt upon such judgment or judgments
so recovered, or that shall be recovered in the neighbouring colonies as aforsesaid, in any executive court
within this province, proper to try the same, in such way
and manner as he or they might have done if such
judgment or judgments had been originally recovered in
Acts and Resolves of the Province of Massachusetts Bay
(1769-1780) 323-324, being Chap. 16, Second Session. The Act is
cited as 14 Geo. III, Ch. II. This act was repealed in 1794. Acts and
Laws of the Commonwealth of Massachusetts, 1794-1795 (pub. in
1896) c. 65, 120-129.
'V
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the executive court in this province where said action
of debt shall be brought.
"Sec. 2.
a true copy of the record and proceedings of the said court or courts in the said neighboring
colony or colonies, according to the custom and usage

of the colony where said judgment or judgments were
shall be to all intents and
or shall be recovered,

purposes as good and sufficient evidence of such judgment, and have the same effect and operation, as if the
original judgment and proceedings had been rendered

and had in the court where such action of debt shall be
brought and depending."

This act has many inportant features which are mirrored
in later decisions under the Constitution's full faith, and credit
clause. It is limited to a final judgment. No interlocutory
decree could be a basis for an action of debt. The type of
judgment is not stated. It applies to judgments recovered
prior to the passage of this act as well as after. Like the Maryland act, it expands the old action of debt on judgments recovered in the Massachusetts courts to include judgments recovered in the courts of other jurisdictions. While this act
would exclude the judgments of courts not within the continental limits of the present United States, an unanswered
question is whether it excluded judgments of those colonies
within the present United States which were not "neighboring", i.e., immediately adjacent to Mlassachusetts Bay36 It
is interesting to note that the procedure to be followed is that
followed in the Massachusetts Bay courts, but the evidentiary
requirements, i.e., authentication, are not those of Massachusetts
Bay but of the court wherein the original judgment was recovered. Not only must the judgment be set forth but also theentire proceedings or "judgment roll." The act of Mlassachusetts Bay not only paraphrased the Connecticut act that the
judgment roll will be "good and sufficient evidence" but goes
beyond that it shall "have the same effect and operation, as
if the original judgment had been recovered in lassachuSetts. 1117
" Cf. PA. statute cited fn. 13, supra.

such faith
17Cf. U. S. Revised Statutes, sec. 905, ff., fn. 34: "
as they have by law or usage in the
and credit given to them
courts of the State from which they are taken." (Underlining mine).
The Massachusetts statute thus provides available enforcement
machinery which might be otherwise lacking if it would have to
give the judgment the treatment accorded it in the forum rendering
the judgment.
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Even though the colonies had courts functioning prior to
the adoption of the Articles of Confederation, I have found no
reported decisions bearing upon the interpretation of the Connecticut, Maryland or Massachusetts Bay Acts, or upon the
enforcement m the colonial courts of the judgments of a foreign country or a sister colony
June 11, 1776, the Continental Congress passed a resolution
for the purpose of organizing two committees-one to prepare a
declaration of independence, and the other to frame a constitutional government. The Declaration of Independence was
adopted within a month, the Articles of the Confederation were
reported on the twelfth of July, 1776, but were not adopted by
the Congress until November 15, 1777 They were not ratified
by the legislatures of all the states until March, 1781.
It was in the last and sixteenth month of the committee's
work that a full faith and credit provision was even considered.
It does not appear at all in the original drafts. Neither Dickinson's draft nor the second draft had a full faith and credit
clause.
The scriveners had little analogous clauses to refer to in
order to guide them in their efforts. The proposed article was
unique among the constitutions of federal types of government.
No similar clause is found in the various constitutions that must
have been known to the committeemen, such as the original
league of the Swiss Cantons of 1291, the Union of Utrecht, or
the act of Union between England and Scotland under Queen
Anne.is Perhaps some of the drafters of these documents
thought it unnecessary to place a provision of this type m the
articles which form a nation's government."
The delegates
by Ross, op. cit. supra, note 5 at 140.
In the minds of some modern statesmen it must still lack the
necessity of such a preeminent location as in a constitution, as evidenced by the omission of a full faith and credit clause from the
Constitution of the Philippines, written in 1934. ARUEGO, JOSE M.,
THE FRAMING OF THE PHILIPPINE CONSTITUTION, University Publishing
1Suggested
"

Co., Inc., Manila, 1937- Philippines (Commonwealth) Constitution1945. Manila Bureau of Printing, 1945. It will be interesting to learn
whether or not the new Constitution of China, which apparently is
creating a federal system, will contain such a clause. Dean Pound
does not discuss this, though he is the legal adviser. Pound, Roscoe,
The Chinese Constitution (1947) 22 N. Y. U. L. Q. 194. But the Australian Constitution is similar to ours. See sec. 118.
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found no help in the various proposals to unify the American
Colonies which were advanced prior to the Articles of Confederation, such as The New England Confederation of 1643, the
Proposed Union for the Colonies of 1697 and the Albany Plan
of 1754, inasmuch as each omitted such a clause. However,
the lawyer-delegates must have been familiar with the English
decisions in this field,20 as well as the colonial acts of Connecticut, Maryland and Massachusetts Bay
A committee of three, James Duane of New York, Richard If. Lee of Virginia, and Richard Law of Comnecticut, had
been appointed to report on any additional articles. Their
report made November 11, 1777, only four days before the
Articles were completed, contained this article which became the
full faith and credit clause of the Articles of the Confederation.
"The better to secure and perpetuate mutual
friendship and intercourse among the people of the
different states in this union, the free inhabitants of
each of these states, paupers, vagabonds, and fugitives
from justice excepted, shall be entitled to all privileges and immunities of free citizens in the several
states; and the people of each State shall have free ingress and regress to and from any other State, and
shall enjoy therein all the privileges of trade and commerce, subject to the same duties, impositions, and
restrictions, as the inhabitants thereof respectivelyprovided, that such restrictions shall not extend so far
as to prevent the removal of property imported into
any State, to any other State of which the owner is
an inhabitant; provided, also, that no imposition,
duties, or restriction, shall be laid by any State on
the property of the United States ,or either of them.
If any person guilty of, or charged with treason,
felony or other high misdemeanor in any State, shall
flee from justice and be found in any of the United
States, he shall, upon demand of the governor or executive power of the State from which he fled, be delivered up and removed to the State having jurisdiction of his offence.
Full faith and credit shall be given in each of
these states to the records, acts, and judicial proceedings of the courts and magistrates of every other
State."
When that article -was presented for the consideration of
the convention, an unnamed individual made the motion that
the last paragraph of this proposed article read
- As summarized by Professor Radin in 39 Ill. L. Rev. 1, 11-15;
Professor Yntema, 33 Mich. L. Rev 1129, 1143-44.
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"Full faith and credit shall be given in each of
these states to the records, acts and judicial proceed-

ings of the courts and magistrates of every other
state, and an action of debt may lie in a court of law of
any State for the recovery of a debt due on a judgment of any court in any other state; provided the
judgment creditor shall give bond with sufficient
sureties before the said court, in which action shall
be brought, to answer on damages to the adverse
party in case the original judgment should be afterwards revised and set aside, and provided the party
against whom such judgment may have been obtained,
had notice in fact of the service of the original writ
upon which such judgment shall be founded."
This motion had some important features. It expanded
the "judgments" or "verdicts and sentences" of the Connecticut, Maryland and Massachusetts acts to read "judicial
proceedings." It included the "records, acts" of a court. It
gave an action of debt due on a judgment but said nothing
about an action of debt lying for facts stated in an act of a
court that would not yet be considered a final judgment. Moreover, it gave the court rendering the original judgment full
control over the judgment by permitting it to revise and set it
aside, the judgment creditor thus having the risk if he proceeded before the time for setting aside the judgment had
elapsed, and the debtor being amply protected by the surety
requirement. Finally, it emphasized that the judgment debtor
must "have had notice in fact" of the original writ.
Unfortunately this motion was defeated. No recorded
reason has been found for it being overruled. Perhaps they
deemed unnecessary the "notice in fact" requirement and
were not interested in requiring the judgment creditor to furnish sureties. Also, their original idea may have been to limit
full faith and credit to the matters mentioned in the immediately preceding paragraph, namely, the extradition of felons.
This theory is reinforced by the three committee members
having voted against the proposed amendment.
From the time the Articles were adopted to the approval of
th.e Constitution by the States, I have found only four reported
cases concerning the full faith and credit clause. Only the first
case interprets the clause or sheds any light thereon for futurereference.
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That case was an action of trovern.2 During the Revolution, a privateer had been fitted out in North Carolina, and
while on a cruise against the enemy, landed on Edisto Island,
then under the jurisdiction of England. The privateers took
away a number of negroes, the purported property of the
plaintiff in this action, and carried them to Washington, North
Carolina, where they were condemned in a court of admiralty
and sold as the property of the enemies of the United States.
The plaintiff brought this action in the courts of South Carolina
and defendant pleaded the North Carolina judgment as a
defense.
The court, in a per curiam opinion, said
"We are bound by the sentence of the court of

admiralty in North Carolina, until reversed by some

competent authority, and are obliged to give due faith
and credit to all its proceedings. The act of confederation is conclusive as to this point, and the law of nations, is equally strong upon it."
Had the court entirely disregarded the full faith and credit
clause of the Confederation, it had ample precedent to justify
its decision. If the usual rule were followed, it was bound by
the m rem?. decrees of admiralty courts of foreign jurisdictions.
In addition, plaintiff was not bringing an action of debt on a
judgment of a foreign court, but the defendant was pleading
the admiralty judgment as a defense. Under the English decisions, while a transcript of a foreign judgment was merely prima
facie evidence as a cause of action, it was conclusive if pleaded
as a defense.
Another case decided was that of James v Allen.2 2 Plaintiff had obtained judgment in November, 1782, in a New Jersey
court, after having had personal service on the defendant. April
27, 1783, plaintiff had defendant arrested in Pennsylvania for
the same debt, defendant gave bail and returned to New Jersey
where he was taken on a capias satisfaciendum. Under the
New Jersey insolvency act, he was discharged in October, 1783.
Defendant had been ruled to plead in Pennsylvania, and failing to do so, judgment was entered against him. Defendant
-Jenkins v. Putnam, 1 Bay (S. C. Law) 8 (1784)
1 Dallas 188 (Ct. of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County,
1786)
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then moved the Pennsylvania court to set aside the default
judgment and to permit him to plead the New Jersey discharge.
The court overruled this motion, because the New Jersey order
was local in nature, that "by the very terms of the order as
well as under the New Jersey statute" it "goes no further than
to discharge him from his imprisonment in the Goal of Essex
County in the State of New Jersey, which if fullest obedience
were paid to it, it could not authorize a subsequent discharge
from imprisonment in another Gaol in another State."
The
court also said, and quite unnecessarily for the disposition of
this case, that "The Articles of Confederation seem chiefly intended to oblige each State to receive the records of another
as full evidence of such Acts and Judicial Proceedings." Apparently the court had in mind the evidentiary requirements
of the full faith and credit clause, and that it was limited
only to evidence and prescribed no effect to the evidence, once
introduced.
The third case is that of Kibbe v Kibbe,2 3 which, was an
action of debt on a judgment rendered by the Massachusetts
Common Pleas. The original action in Massachusetts was
covenant. The defendant was served by having his handkerchief attached in Massachusetts, and a copy of the writ of attachment left at his home in Connecticut. He failed to appear
in the Massachusetts court and judgment by default was entered against him. The defendant filed a demurrer to plaintiff's surrejomder in the Comnecticut action, which set forth
the mode of service by a Massachusetts deputy sheriff who left
a copy of the writ at the defendant's Connecticut home. The
per curin opinion of the Connecticut court, which found for
the defendant, said that for the plaintiff to recover on the
Massachusetts judgment, the Massachusetts court had to have
jurisdiction, "and so no action ought to be admitted on said
judgment;" it likewise stated that the plaintiff's declaration
did not show that both parties were within the jurisdiction of
the 'assachusetts court, nor that the defendant had duly served
with process, nor that he had "or might have had a fair trial
of the cause."
Had there been personal service of process on the defendant
'Kirby, 119 (Conn., 1786).
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within Massachusetts, that would have appeared on the transcript. If a "fair trial" consisted of observing all the procedural requirements of Massachusetts, that could also be
shown, but how could the other elements of "fairness" be
shown on a transcript?
Judge Dyer added the following remarks to the per
curam opinion.
"1 the original action was upon a covenant real,
and locally annexed where the lands lye, and the
judgment being by default, this court never could take
cognizance of or examine into the justice of the
cause.
Did he thereby mean that they would not give credence to
judgments based on "local" actions ? Did he mean also that
the Connecticut court never would take cognizance of a judgment obtained by default? Undoubtedly he meant default of
service and not a default judgment obtained by failure of a
party defendant, properly served, to plead or defend.
The fourth case decided under the Articles of Confederation's full faith and credit clause is Phelps v Holker 24 In that
case an attachment had been filed in Massachusetts against one
blanket. A judgment was entered and then debt on the judgment was brought in the Pennsylvania courts. The court held
for the defendant, the reason therefor being stated by Justice
Bryan "By the very words of the Massachusetts act, the
judgment and execution in a foreign attachment, shall go only
against the goods attached." Actually this case was limited to
an interpretation of the Massachusetts foreign attachment act
and no interpretation was given or needed of the Fourth
Article of the Articles of the Confederation.
From these cases we derive the following principles.
1. The courts would not give full faith and credit to a
judgment of a sister state court unless that judgment had been
procured after due opportunity for the defendant to present
his side of the case. While this whittled down the plenary
phrase of "judicial proceedings" to mean "judicial proceedings m which defendant had an opportunity to present his
"1 Dallas 261 (Penn. Supreme, 1788)
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side of .the case, "..certainly it is consistent with our notions of
due process.
2. The full faith and credit clause of the Articles of Confederation was concerned with evidence and not with the effect
of such evidence.
This latter principle is particularly interesting because it
was stated in 1lloulin v Iiisuraizce Company,25 that "Congress
could not provide the method of authentication" under this
clause of the Articles of the Confederation. The net effect, assuming that conclusion is sound, is that each state of the Confederation could thereby prescribe its own requirements as to
authentication-just what -assachusetts Bay permitted under
its colonial act. But the requirement is mandatory full faith
and credit shall be given. Therefore is not the power to legislate impliedq Yet there was no court created to decide the
' 26
meaning of the phrase "full faith and credit."
In addition, "Congress could not legislate upon what
should be the effect of a judgment obtained in one state in the
other states."27 Again it seems that the power to legislate as
to the effect to be given an authenticated judgment should be
implied. Thus each of the colonies could decide what effect it
would give to such a judgment. In other words, it was possible
for each state court to lay down its own requirements as to
authentication and to prescribe the effect thereof-a relapse to
the status that existed prior to the adoption of these Articles.
The literal wording of the clause itself indicates an important limitation. It is concerned only with the records, acts and
judicial proceedings of the courts, and did not include the
records and acts- of any other branch of the respective state's
government.
Confronted with these defects of the full faith and credit
clause of the Articles of Confederation, the delegates to the
Constitutional Convention attempted to revise it. The sug"24 N. J. L. 222 (1853)
" The same question arose under the problem of whether or not
the first sentence of Art. IV, sec. 1 of the Constitution is self-executing or not.
IMcElmoyle v Cohen, 13 Pet. 326 (1839). Mr. Justice Black,
dissenting in Order of United Commercial Travelers v Wolfe, 67 S.
Ct. 1355, 1375 (June 9, 1947) "The plain effect of today's decision
is to overrule the McElmoyle case."
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gested revisions made by the delegates appear in the records of
the Federal Convention, reproduced in Max Farrand's "The
Records of the Federal Convention of 1787 " An able analysis
of these records insofar as it affects the full faith and credit
clause has been made. 2s The proceedings indicate that the delegates considered it important that Congress be given legislative powers in order to carry out the concept of "full faith and
credit," that since the word "shall" and not "may" was
adopted, the extending of full faith and credit was mandatory, while there were no instancese known of one government "executing" judgments of the courts of another, yet it
was possible to give Congress the power to provide legislation
for the execution of judgments. Whether or not it was given
never has been settled. 29 Also, it was decided that full faith
and credit should be given to the acts and records of all the
departments of a sister state government as well as to the proceedings of the sister state's judiciary
In its final form, Article IV, Section 1, of the United
States Constitution, reads
"Full Faith and Credit shall be given in each
State to the public Acts, Records, and judicial proceedings of every other State. And the Congress may by
general Laws prescribe the manner in which such
Acts, Records and Proceedings shall be proved, and
the Effect thereof."
Contrasting this with the Fourth Article of the Articles
of Confederation, Congress now has the power to legislate as
Cook, Walter Wheeler, supra, note 5.
It is interesting to compare Cook's proposal in 28 Yale L. J.,
fn. 5, and Madison's statement as written in II Farrand, p. 445:
"Madison. Wednesday, August 29th. 1787. In Convention
He
(Mr. Madison) wished the legislature might be authorized to provide for the execution of judgments in other States, under such

regulations as might be expedient-He thought that this might be
safely done and was justified by the nature of the Union. Mr. Randolph said there was no instance of one nation executing judgments
of the Courts of another nation
" with DEERING'S CALIFORNIA
CODE ANN., CIVIL PROCEDURE-EVIDENCE, sec. 1913, p. 467; REVISED
CODE OF MONTANA (1935), sec. 10563, p. 864; OREGON, COMPILED LAWS
ANN., Vol. I, sec. 2-723, p. 308; CODE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE OF THE
PHILIPPINE ISLANDS (Ann. by Claro M. Recto, 1925), Sec. 309, and
CODIGO DE ENJURCIAMIENTO CIVIL DE PUERTO Rico, Sec. 426, p. 189:
"The effect of a judicial record of a sister state is the same in this
state as in the state where it was made, except that it can only be
"
enforced here by an action or special proceeding
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to how the acts, records and judicial proceedings of every
other state shall be proved in state courts. The federal government can legislate as to a rule of evidence which the state
courts are required to follow. In addition, once such act, record
or judicial proceeding is proved in the prescribed manner, then
Congress can tell the judiciary of a state what effect such evidence shall have in the court in which it was produced. And
not only is the judicial proceeding of a court of a sister state
admissible with the prescribed effect, but so also are the public
acts and records of the other departments of a sister state government.
In an attempt to carry out its powers under this provision,
the First Congress of the United States passed "An Act to
prescribe the mode in which the public acts, records, and judicial proceedings, in each State, shall be authenticated so as to
take effect in every other State."
"Be it enacted, etc., That the acts of the Legislatures of the Several States shall be authenticated by
having the seal of their respective States affixed
thereto; that the records and judicial proceedings of
the courts of any State shall be proved or admitted in

any other court within the United States, by the attestation of the clerk, and the seal of the court annexed,
if there be a seal, together with a certificate of the
judge, chief justice, or presiding magistrate, as the
case may be, that the said attestation is in due form.
And the said records and judicial proceedings, authenticated as aforesaid, shall have such faith and credit
given to them in every court within the United States,
as they have by law or usage in the courts of the State
from whence the said records
are, or shall be taken.
Approved, May 26, 1790.''3

The House passed this bill on Il'ay 3rd, 1790, the Senate on
May 5th, 1790. Other bills passed during the same session
indicated not only the dates the respective chambers passed
them, but also gave the date the President signed each bill. In
this case, it merely stated the date of approval as being May 26.
1790, which I assume is the date the bill was signed by Presi-

dent Washington.
That little care was given to this bill is seen by the lack
of discussion thereon in either house on its final reading, and
by its lack of completeness
' Appendix to Volume II, Annals of Congress, First Congress
(1789-1791), p. 225.

CONSTITUTIONAL

LAw

1. Authentication requirements were laid down as to the
acts of state legislatures and the "records and judicial proceedings" of state courts. No authentication standards were
stated as to the records or acts of a state's executive department.
2. The legislative acts and judicial records and proceedings of territories or colomal possessions were not included in
the authentication requirements, nor were they mentioned as to
what effect they were to have given them, once authenticated
and offered in evidence.
3. It failed to prescribe any effect to state legislative acts,
once authenticated.
4. "The records and judicial proceedings of state courts
shall have such faith and credit given them in every court
within the United States." Nothing is said concerning the
faith and credit to be given these same records and judicial
proceedings in the courts of territories or colomal possessions of
the United States, outside its continental limits.
5. As stated in paragraph 4, supra, it does not read "full
faith and credit" but reads "such faith and credit."
Did tns act set up the effect to be given to the records and
judicial proceedings of a state court, once authenticated and
offered in evidence in any other court within the United States "
If "faith and credit" means "good evidence" or "full evidence" as it was defined under the similar clause in the Articles of the Confederacy, the Act of 1790 failed to establish
any quantitative standard of effectiveness.
This problem was fully discussed by five judges of the
Supreme Court of New York, who decided Hitchcock v
A c ken.31 Plaintiff had filed an action of debt on a judgment
that he had recovered in Vermont, personal service having been
obtained upon the defendant in Vermont. All five of the judges
held that the Constitution stated two objectives (1) the manner
of proving judicial proceedings of the States, and (2) the effect
of the judicial proceedings of another State, once proved. But
three of the judges decided that when the Act of 1790 declared
"such faith and credit" it meant "full faith and credit", that

-1 Cames 460 (New York Supreme, 1803).
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faith and credit is concerned only with evidence and not with
the effect to be given such evidence, and that Congress had not
exercised its:power to prescribe the effect to.be given such admissible documents. Therefore the Act of 1790 left the question
as to the legal effect and operation to be given an authenticated
judicial proceeding precisely where it was prior to the adoption
of the Constitution.
This view had been previously rejected by the United
States Circuit Court for the District of Pennsylvana, in the
case of Armstrong v Carson's Executors.32 An action of debt
had been brought upon a New Jersey state court judgment.
Defendant pleaded nil debet, counsel for the plaintiff argued
that the plea was inadmissible, citing the full faith and credit
clause and the Act of 1790. "Ingersoll, for the defendant, declined arguing the point, thinking it clearly against him." MVr.
Justice Wilson stated.
"There can be no difficulty in this case. If the
plea would be bad in the Courts of New Jersey, it is
bad here: for, whatever doubts there might be on the
words of the Constitution, the act of Congress effectually removes them; declaring in direct terms, that
the record shall have the same effect in this Court, as
in the Court from which it was taken. In the courts
of New Jersey, no such plea would be sustained; and,
therefore, it is inadmissible in any Court sitting in
Pennsylvania."
Despite the passage of another federal act in 1804, this
point was not settled until Mills v Duryee3 3 was decided in
1813, holding in accordance with the ninority in Hitchcock v
Awcken, and following Armstrong v Carson's Executors. Thus
the 1790 Act accomplished setting up the authentication requirements of a "record or judicial proceeding of a state
court" and of "the acts of the Legislatures of the Several
States," but prescribed the effect to be given only to such
authenticated judicial records, and not to legislative acts, when
produced in any other court of the United States.
The act passed in 1804, integrated with the Act of 1790,
now appears as sections 905 and 906 of the Revised Statutes of
the United States. These sections read as follows
'2 Dallas 302 (U. S. Circuit Court for the District of Pennsylvanma, 1794).
7 Cranch 481 (U. S., 1813)
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"The acts of the legislature of any State or Territory, or of any country subject to the jurisdiction of
the United States, shall be authenticated by having
the seals of such State, Territory or country affixed
thereto. The records and judicial proceedings of the
courts of any State or Territory or of any such country, shall be proved or admitted in any other court
within the United States, by the attestation of the
clerk, and the seal of the court annexed, if there be a
seal, together with a certificate of the judge, chief
justice, or presiding magistrate, that the said attestation is in due form. And the said records and judicial
proceedings, so authenticated, shall have such faith and
credit given to them in every court within the United
the courts of
States as they have by law or usage " in
'
the State from which they are taken.
"All records and exemplifications of books, which
may be kept in any public office of any State or Territory, or of any country subject to the jurisdiction of
the United States, not appertaining to a court, shall
be proved or admitted in any court or office in any
other State or Territory, or in any such country, by
the attestation of the keeper of the said records or
books, and the seal of his office annexed, if there be a
seal, together with a certificate of the presiding justice
of the court of the county, parish, or district in which
such office may be kept, or of the governor, or secretary of state, the chancellor or keeper of the great
seal, of the State, or Territory or country, that the
said attestation is in due form, and by the proper officers. If the said certificate is given by the presiding
justice of a court, it shall be further authenticated by
the clerk or prothonotary of the said court, who shall
certify, under his hand and the seal of his office, that
the said presiding Justice is duly commissioned and
qualified; or, if given by such governor, secretary,
chancellor, or keeper of the great seal, it shall be
under the great seal of the State, Territory, or country
aforesaid in which it is made. And the said records
and exemplifications, so authenticated, shall have such
faith and credit given to them in every court and office within the United States as they have by law or
usage in the courts or offices of the State, Territory,
or country, as aforesaid, from which they are taken."33
The Act of 1804 fills at least two important needs that had not
been met by the 1790 Act. By its first section, the later act
states the authentication requirements of the books and records
of an executive department of a state government, thereby
eliminating one gap left by the Act of 1790. By its second section, the authentication requirements are stated as to the acts,
records and judicial proceedings of territorial governments and

Title 28, Sec. 687, U. S. Code or USCA or FCA.

Title 28, Sec. 688, U. S. Code or USCA or FCA.

KENTUCKY LAW JOURNAL

those of countries subject to the jurisdiction of the United
States. The books of any public office, once authenticated, are
to be given effect in the offices as well as in the courts of various
governmental units within the United States.
In addition the 1804 Act prescribed that "such faith and
credit" were to be given to the acts of legislatures, records and
proceedings of courts, and to the record and exemplifications of
books, of any state, territory, or of any country subject to the
jurisdiction of the United States." However, again nothing is
said as to the faith and credit to be given these authenticated
documents when admitted in evidence in the courts of territories
or countries subject to the jurisdiction of the United States, located outside the limits of the continental United States.
This objection to the Act of 1790 still remains and can
be illustrated as follows
assume P recovered a judgment
against D in a court of Country A, which is located beyond the
continental limits of the United States, but is subject to its
jurisdiction. D goes to New York without satisfying the judgment. P may authenticate his judgment in accordance with
the acts of 1790 and 1804, file suit against D in the proper
court located within New York, and the New York court must
give "such faith and credit to this judgment of the court of
Country A as is given this judgment in Country A."
Change the initial forum. P recovered a judgment against
D in a court of record of the State of New York. D goes to
Country A, without satisfying the judgment. P may have his
judgment authenticated in New York, and file suit against D m
the proper court of Country A. That court must admit as evdence the authenticated judgment but need not give such faith
and credit to the New York judgment as is given that judgment in New York. The effect of the New York judgment
would depend entirely upon the views of the courts of Country
A under International Law. It may be treated as a judgment
of a foreign country, and entitled only to comity, and have no
conclusive effect as to the merits of the judgment obtained in
New York.30
This is theoretically possible, as was first pointed out by Costigan, op. cit., note 5. But some of the territories subject to the jurisdiction of the United States have legislated otherwise. Prior to its
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There is thereby in existence an anomalous situation which
may be of great practical importance in the activities of courts
of territories recently acquired by the United States in various
parts of the world, as well as those heretofore acquired. Additional difficulty is seen when we consider that under these
statutes it is possible for American courts established in military
occupation zones to have their proceedings receive full faith and
credit by courts within the United States without their being
subject to the same obligation in return, unless otherwise especially provided for. The very purpose of the Act of 1804 was
to expand uniformity of judicial proceedings and the application of public acts in the United States dominated courts, which
cannot be achieved under the present wording. Actually this
prevents an effective symmetry to the law within all jurisdictions subject to the control of the United States.
Because they cover more jurisdictions whose public acts,
books, records and judicial proceedings are entitled to full
faith and credit than does the constitutional provision, the statutes create another problem, as exemplified by the following
situation
P filed an action for divorce from D in a Court of
First Instance of the Philippines. D was granted a divorce on
his cross-complaint and the court held that he was the owner of
certain certificates representing an interest in a "sociedad
anonna", having a legal entity in the Philippines which approximates our corporate form of business organization. 1,
independence, Sec. 309,

CODE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE OF THE PHILIPPPINE

provided: "The effect of a judicial record of a court of the
United States or of a court of one of the United States, is the same
in the Philippine Islands as in the United States, or in the State or
Territory where it was made." Puerto Rico, sec. 426, op cit., note 29,
provides: "The effect of a judicial record of a sister state is the same
" Sec. 437 provides:
in this state as in the state where it was made
"The provisions of the preceding sections of this article are equally
applicable to the public writings of the United States, or a territory
of the United States." CANAL ZONE CODE, Title 4, sections 1939 and
1950 repeat verbatim the Puerto Rico provisions. I have found no
legislation of a similar nature for the Territory of Hawaii. The one
reported decision of the Supreme Court of Hawaii, dealing with the
full faith and credit problem, failed to perceive this distinction; the
court seemed to assume that the full faith and credit clause was
applicable to a judgment of a California state court in the Territory
of Hawaii, though denying to enforce it because of plaintiff's failure
to allege and prove that the Califorma court had jurisdiction. Peterson v. Peterson, 24 Haw. 239 (1918)
ISLANDS ,
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having had these certificates in New York, was made a defendant in an action filed by D in a New York, state court, which
court held that P was the owner of the certificates, and thereby
entitled to the dividends accrued thereupon. P then attached
the funds on deposit in a California bank of the "sociedad
anonima" by process issuing out of a Califoria state court.
Should the California court follow the judgment of the New
York or the Philippine court? The New York judgment is blessed
with the Constitution commanding full faith and credit. The
Philippine judgment is to be given "such faith and credit" as
-it would receive in the Philippines-by rule of a mere statute.
The California court said.
"At the oral argument the court suggested the

possibility that since recognition of judicial proceedings of the Philippine Islands is governed by federal

statute, whereas the Constitution commands that full
faith and credit be given to the New York judgment,
we might be compelled to accept such state judgment
in the event of conflict. We do not place our decision
on this ground. rather, the ground of decision herein
is that the New York decision as the last in time is
controlling as' to the effect to be given the Philippine
proceedings."
Properly tis question ought not to arise, since the failure
of one court to give full faith and credit to the proceedings of
another jurisdiction ought properly to be passed upon by the
United States Supreme Court, instead of being placed before
the courts of a third state or territory
Other problems have been created as a result of the wordmg of these statutes and the limited application of the full
faith and credit clause. -WhenCongress passed the Acts of 1790
and 1804, thereby stating the effect to be given a state s judicial
proceedings, acts and records, not only in every other state
court, but also in every court within the United States, it
exceeded the constitutional objective, but not its constitutional
power. The authority to prescribe authentication requirements
and what effect an authenticated judgment or record or public
act of a sister state may have in the federal or territorial courts
is found in Congress' power to establish a federal judiciary and
in its power to regulate the territory or other property of the
'- Perkins v. Benquet Consolidated Mining Co., 55 Cal. App. (2d)
120, 745, 132 P (2d) 170 (1942).
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United States. Admittedly, Congress can set up the authentication requirements and the effect to be given to the legislative
acts, records and judicial proceedings, and the books of a public
office, so authenticated, of.
State A in State B's courts;
State A in United States Court C;
State A in United States Territorial Court DThe United States in United States Court C;
The United States in United States Territorial
Court D;
6. A United States territory in United States Court
D, and
7. A United States territory in United States Territorial Court D.

1.
2.
3.
4.
5.

But does Congress have the power to set out the effect and
authentication requirements as to the acts, records and judicial
proceedings, and the books of a public office, of.
8. The United States in State Court A?
9. A United States territory in State Court A?
10. "Any country subject to the jurisdiction of the
United States" in State Court A?
It certainly has the power to prescribe the effect, once admitted
"So far as this statutory provision relates to the
effect to be given to the judicial proceedings of the
States, it is founded on Art. 4, sect. 1, of the Constitution, which, however, does not extend to the other
cases covered by the statute. The power to prescribe
what effect shall be given to the judicial proceedings
of the courts of the United States is conferred by other
provisions of the Constitution, such as those which declare the extent of the judicial power of the United
States, which authorize all legislation necessary and
proper for executing the powers vested by the Constitution in the government of the United States, or in
any department or officer thereof, and which declare
the supremacy of the authority of the national government within the limits of the Constitution. As part of
its general authority, the power to give effect to the
judgments of its courts is coextensive with its territorial jurisdiction."'
But the mode of authentication in the last three examples
appears to be solely a matter of the legislatures and courts of
State A to decide. Otherwise the sovereignty of a state would
be infringed.
'Mr.

(1882).

Justice Matthews in Embry v. Palmer, 107 U. S. 3, 9-10
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Thus we have the situation of a state being able to prescribe
the evidentiary requirements of the acts, records and judicial
proceedings of any other government except those of a sister
state. This is, of course, the basis upon which much state
legislation rests, hereinafter discussed, Part II of this series
of papers.
Neither the Constitution nor the statutes covers the
authentication or effect to be prescribed to the acts, records or
judicial proceedings of a foreign country
M[r. Chief Justice
White, in disposing of the defendant's contention that a
Canadian judgment on a life insurance contract was a bar to
the plaintiff's action on the same contract brought m a state
court of laine, and therefore conferring jurisdiction on the
Uited States Supreme Court to review the state court's decision on a writ of error, said.
"No such right, privilege, or immunity, however,
is conferred by the Constitution or by any statute of
the United States in respect to the judgments of foreign states or nations, and we are referred to no treaty
relative to such a right."
There is no quarrel with this reasoning; the difficulty arises
from the inconsistency of our policy The national government has most points of contact with foreign nations, but in
dealing with the evidentiary rules concerning the laws, judgments and records of foreign govermnents, and the effect they
are to receive in the state courts within the United States, there
is no uniform standard. The lawyer's clause has insufficient
coverage.
Is a judgment rendered by the court of a country before
it was admitted to statehood or before it became a territory or
country under the jurisdiction of the United States entitled to
full faith and credit by courts within the United States2 Again
this is a timely question as to the treatment to be given judicial proceedings of courts in areas which eventually will or have
come under the jurisdiction of the United States during World
War II. How this problem was previously handled is indicated by two cases
In Keene v JY'Donough, 8 Peters 308 (U. S., 1834), the
'Aetna

Life Insurance Co. v Tremblay, 223 U. S. 185, 190, 56

L. ed. 398, 32 S. Ct. 309 (1912).
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plaintiff claimed title to a plantation situated near Baton Rouge
by virtue of his being the highest bidder at a public sale under
Spamsh law when Spain was the owner of the Louisiana territory The defendant asserted his title through a judicial
proceeding of a Spaish tribunal which annulled the prior
sale to plaintiff who had neglected to pay the requisite amount,
the decree exposing the plantation again to public sale, and the
]ighest bidder at this sale being defendant's predecessor in
title. In upholding defendant's title asserted from the decree
of the Spanish tribunal, the court said at page 310
"
they (the adjudications of the Spanish tribunal)
must, at least be taken as prima facie evidence of a
judicial proceeding, to pass the title of land, according
to the course and practice of the Spanish law in that
province. The adjudication having been made by a
Spanish tribunal, after the cession of the country to the
United States, does not make it void; for we know,
historically, that the actual possession of the territory
was not surrendered until some time after these proceedings took place. It was the judgment, therefore, of
a competent Spanish tribunal, having jurisdiction of
the case, and rendered whilst the country, although
ceded, was, de facto, in the possession of Spain, and
subject to Spanish laws. Such judgments, so far as
they affect the private rights of the parties thereto,
must be deemed valid."
Note the phrases "at least be taken as prima facie evidence
" and must be "deemed valid," which is the same language
employed by the courts when considering the effect to be
rendered judgments of courts of foreign countries. Had the
prmm facie defense established by the defendant's allegation
of the Spamsh tribunal's judicial proceeding been rebutted,
the plaintiff might have prevailed. That plaintiff had an opportunity to rebut the defense indicates the court considered
the full faith and credit clause inapplicable to judgments rendered by courts of areas which at the time of rendition were
uot under the jurisdiction of the United States.
This conclusion is reinforced by the decision of the United
States Supreme Court in the case of Muttual Life Iiisurance
Conipany v. McGrew, 188 U. S. 291 (1902) In that case, the
husband had been granted a divorce in 1894 by a Circuit Court
of Hawaii, on the grounds of his wife's adultery, the decree
containing a provision pursuant to a Hawaiian statute, that

KENTUCKY LAiW JOUR.NAL

when a divorce was decreed for the wife's adultery, the husband
would hold her personal estate forever. A few months later
the husband died. His adminustrator filed suit in the Hawaiian
courts against the 'Mutual Life Insurance Company to collect
the proceeds on a policy of insurance on the husband's life,
payable to his wife. The ex-wife had not been joined as a
party, by interpleader or otherwise, she had moved to California prior to the granting of the divorce. In 1895 the
Hawaiian courts held that the administrator was entitled to the
proceeds of the policy on the husband's life. This judgment
was paid by the insurance company
Thereafter the wife filed suit against the same insurance
company on the same insurance contract in the state courts of
California. The state supreme court affirmed the trial court's
judgment on February 28th, 1901, that the wife should recover
the proceeds. The California courts recognized the decree of
divorce granted by the courts of the Kingdom of Hawaii which
dissolved the marriage, but, refused to enforce that portion of
the decree which applied the Hawaiian statute which forfeited
the wife's personalty to the husband. The California courts
held that the collection of the life insurance policy proceeds was
governed by the California law, the domicile of the wife. The
writ of error to the United States Supreme Court, one ground
of which was the failure of the California courts to give full
faith and credit to the decisions of the Hawaiian courts, was
dismissed. Mr. Chief Justice Fuller pointed out that the California trial court's judgment was entered in 1897, that the
resolutions of annexation were passed in 1898 and that the act
to provide a government for Hawaii was passed in 1900. "
we cannot retain jurisdiction on the ground of the assertion of
a Federal right which did not exist when the judgment was
rendered in the trial court, and which was not brought to the attention of the highest court of the State in any way whatever."
Must the courts of State A give full faith and credit to the
acts, records and judicial proceedings enacted or entered by
State B or Territory C, prior to the tune State A became one
of the United States 9 An answer can be found from the experience of Texas, which as a Republic, prior to its annexation
as a state, had a unique statute
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"That no suit, proceeding, judgment or degree,
shall. be brought, prosecuted or sustained in any court
or judicial magistracy in tins republic, on any judgment or decree of any court or tribunal of any foreign
nation, state or territory; this republic not being bound
by any international law or courtesy to give credence
or validity to the adjudications of foreign tribunals,
whose measures of justice and rules of decisions are
variant and unknown here. But this provision is in no
degree to affect the validity or obligations of contracts,
engagements or pecuniary liabilities originating
abroad, or the original evidence, testimony or proof,
to establish the same; neither shall this provision extend to or embrace any foreign judgment or decree
for specific property or recovery, introduced as the
basis of a public sale for the transmission of title, or the
record or memorial of any link or muniment of title to
any specific estate, all of which shall depend upon the
present laws of the republic. And this provision shall
not in any manner relate to or affect the determinations of courts of admiralty and maritime jurisdiction
abroad, proceeding in rem, and according to the law
of nations.""

June 23, 1845, Texas' Congress gave its assent to the annexation of the Republic of Texas to the United States. December
29, 1845, the annexation was officially made, so the Republic's
statute of 1841 was annulled by the full faith and credit clause.
The problem can now be restated. must the courts of Texas
give full faith and credit to the judgment of a state court of
Mississippi, entered in Mississippi prior to Texas' annexation9
The language of Bacon v Howard41 would indicate an affirmafive answer. In that case P had recovered a judgment against
D on October 19th, 1840, in a state court of Mississippi. October 22nd, 1850, P's assignee fied an action against D on the
judgment in the District Court of the United States for the
District of Texas. While denying recovery because of the State
of Texas' sxty day statute of limitations, Mr. Justice Grier
said at page 25 of 20 Howard's Reports
any legislation winch denied that full faith and
credit which the Constitution of the United States requires to be given to the judicial proceedings of sister
States would be ipso facto annulled after the annexation on the 29th of December, 1845. Thereafter, the
'Sec 2 of "An Act Creating a system of Bankruptcy and regulating the Collection of Foreign Debts" enacted by the Fifth Congress of Texas, Approved January 19, 1841. 2 Gammel Texas Laws
508.
,20 Howard 22 (1857).
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authenticity of a 3udgment in another state, and its
effect, are to be tested by the Constitution of the
United States and acts of Congress. But rules of prescription remain, as before, in the full power of every
state.

While no mention was made either by counsel or by the
court of the date of the entry of the judgment in the 'Mississippi
courts as being prior to annexation, other than for the question
of prescription, the language quoted indicates that the court
would require full faith and credit to be given to the judgment.
It has a "continuing" effect, at least until it becomes dormant
in the state of rendition, equally as much as an act of the Mfississippi state assembly has, until repealed.
With its usual independence, even after annexation, Texas
refused to give full faith and credit to a complaint winch had
been filed in the courts of the Republic of Texas, based on a
Mississippi chancery decree, the case being on appeal after the
annexation of Texas. 42 The Texas Supreme Court considered the
matter to be ruled by its 1841 statute.
This problem is particularly of moment due to the inpending statehood of Hawaii. It indicates that judgments recovered
in American courts prior to Hawaii becoming a state, will have
to be given full faith and credit by the state courts of Hawaii,
when and if it attains statehood.
The full faith and credit clause states "
judicial proceedings of every other State" and furishes no light as to ineluding magistrate or justice courts' proceedings -within the
term "judicial proceedings."
The authentication reqirements under the acts include the judge's certification and the
clerk's attestation. Some courts find it impossible to have the
transcript attested by the clerk simply because their orgamzation
does not include a clerk-a common situation in justice of the
peace, magistrate and those courts usually designated as inferior
or courts not of record. Did Congress thereby mean to exclude
courts not having a clerk from the provisions of the Acts of
1790 and 18049 The Constitution, as well as the statutes, is
silent as to the rank of the courts in the hierarchy of judicial
proceedings entitled to admission. That silence, plus the require"Wilson

v Tunstall, 6 Texas 221 (1851).
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ment of a clerk by the statutes, has caused extensive litigation
and much state legislation.
Kentucky 43 and Massachusetts 44 have held that the judicial proceedings of inferior courts of other states were not
provided for by the Constitution or laws of the United States
pertaiing to full faith and credit, thus giving them the same
effect as though they were the judgments of courts of foreign
countries. This is consistent with the English, rule which
treats the judgments of its inferior courts not of record as it
treats the judgments of courts of record of foreign countries.
Tennessee has held contra.4 5 If the Massachusetts rule is the
correct one, then a state can prescribe even more stringent
authentication requirements than do the acts of Congress, besides stating what effect these judgments may have in its
courts. In any event a state can prescribe lower standards of
authentication. Those states having express legislation concerning the authentication of foreign inferior courts' judgments
46
are summarized heren.
, McElfatrick v. Taft & Son, 10 Bush (Ky., 1873) 160.
Warren v Flagg, 2 Pick. (Mass., 1824) 449.
Menken v Brinkley 10 Pickle (94 Tenn., 1895) 721, 31 S.W 92.
Jurisdiction
Alaabama.
ode, 1940,
(title 7, see 422

Transcripts of
Justice of
Peace of
State,
Territory in
ii. S.
District of
Columbia

California.
State,
Deering's Code, United States
sees. 1921 and
Territory
1924;
iontana.
Revised Codes,
1935, Annotated,
sees. 10571 and
10574;
Utah.
Code Ann. 1943,
secs. 104-47-16
and 104-47-17.

Are to, be
"Admissible
evidence."

as

"Adnissible evidence of the
facts stated
therein."

If Authenticated by

£iear is

Certified bya. Justice rendering jud[gment, or
b. His successor in offic2e,
or
c. Justice€ having custody
of books,
that it is a true and complete coPy
plus
Certificate of clerk
plus
court seal of any court of
record in county where
iustice court held that said
justice duly commissioned
and ciualified to act.
Certified by justice
that
transcript is correct and
that he had jurisdiction,
plus
Certification
by
clerk of
county in which justice resided under county seal
that he was a justice and
t i a t
his signature is
genuine,
Or
Original or copy of docket
and the oral testimony of
the justice.
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In addition to the problem of whether or not the full
faithi and credit clause includes the proceedings of inferior
courts, there is presented the question of the proper method of
pleading the judgment of a court not of record. The manner
of pleading the judgment differs, depending upon whether the
Georgia.
Code Ann.,
sees. 38.628-9

State

Iowa.
State
Code, 1939
sec. 622.54
Michigan.
Stat. Ann.,
Vol. 21,
see. 27.872
Nebraska.
Rev Stat. 1943,
sec. 25-1287.
State
Tennessee.
William's Code,
1934, Vol. 6,
see. 9757.

"Prima facie evi- Justice's official certificate
plus official certificate of
dence of such
clerk of court of record,
proceedings and
under court's seal, that
judgment."
he is the justice and his
certificate is genuine,
Or
of his
Official certificate
successor in office that he
and
the
successor
is
proper custodian, plus the
official certificate of the
court clerk of record under
court's seal that he is a
justice and successor in
office, and his signature is
genuine.
"Sufficient eviOfficial certificate of justice
dence of such
plus certificate of clerk of
proceedings and
court of record of county
judgment."
where justice resides that
he is acting as justice and
his signature to certificate
is genuine.

"Is evidence of
such proceeding
and judgment."

New York.
Cahill's
New York
Civil Practice,
7th ed.,
see. 394.

State

certificate
that
"Presumptive evi- Justice's
transcript is in all respects
dence of his
correct and that he had
jurisdiction in
plus certifithe cause and of jurisdiction,
cate of clerk of county
the matters
justice
resides
wherein
shown by the
under county court seal
transcript."
that he was a justice at
time of rendering judgment and that the signature is in justice's own
handwriting,
Or
Docket plus oral testimony
of justice that docket is
true and correct and of
his authority to render the
judgment.

Pennsylvania.
Purdon's Stats.
Ann., Title 42,
C. 3, sees.
311-312.

"Adjoining
state."

"Actions of debt Certified that original cause
of action was such as by
oii demands not
Penn. laws would have
exceeding $100
been within the jurisdicdefendant
tion of justices thereof;
shall have right
that is a true and full
to make same
copy and that judgment
defense to the
remains in force, plus ceraction upon said
tificate of clerk of county
judgment as he
under seal that he was
was originally
the justice of such county
entitled to make
to the claim or
demand upon
which it was
founded."
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.Massachusetts or Tennessee interpretation is followed. If the
former, no presumption attaches that the sister state court
rendering the initial judgment had jurisdiction, that it did have
jurisdiction must be alleged and proved by the plaintiff.
The greatest difference in enforcing the judgment of a
court of record of a sister state or a court not of record of a
sister state results f..om the wording of the acts of limitations m
'
4
certain states. i1iassachusetts, 47 Mfichigan, S MNississippl,
°
l
Mlissouri,5 Tennessee& statutes are concerned with the judgments of foreign courts of record. No specific statement is
made concerning the judgments of foreign courts not of record,
which apparently fall into the "all other actions not provided
for" sections of the statutes. However, the following states
have stated expressly that different periods of limitations are
applicable
Number of years before actions
are barred on foreign judgments of
Courts of Record Courts Not of Record

State

105
2052
Iowa -------------------------------------4
Maine .......................................
205
655
657
756
New Mexico -----------------------------New York -------------------------------205
659
Wisconsin
-------------------------------- 10o
661
Thus after 143 years we have these elementary problems
arising from the inadequacy of our federal legislation pertaining to full faith and credit. Omitted from tis discussion are
LAWS OF MASSACHUSETTS, Vol. 9, Ch. 260, sec. 20
(20 years).
4-ANNOTATED

4'MIcH. STATS. ANN., Vol. 20,
"MississiPPI

see. 27.605, p.456 (10 years).
(1942), Vol. 1, Title 6, Ch. 2, sec.

CODE ANNOTATED

734, p. 802 (7 years)
I MISSOURI REVISED

STATUTES ANN. Vol.

1038, p. 261 (10 years).
"'WILLIAMS TENNESSEE
12CODE OF IOWA

(1939)

4, Art. 9, Ch. 6, sec.

CODE (1934), sec. 8601

(10 years).
Vol. II, see. 614.1(7), p. 1821.

'See. 614.1(6).
:'REVISED STATUTES OF MAINE, Ch. 99, sec.
See. 90 (11).

"NEW

MEXICO STATUTES ANNOTATED

p. 728.

(1941)

90 (I).
Vol. II, sec. 270102,

Sec. 27-103, pp. 728-9.
Cahill-Parsons New York Civil Practice, sec. 44 PA-23.
Sec. 48 PA-25.

"WIscONSIN

" Sec. 330.19.

STATUTES

(1945), sec. 330.18.
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several points settled by litigation that nevel' should have taken
place had the statutory problem been adequately considered6 2
TheSe are only the superficial problems
that many more still
must be solved can be seen from two cases m the past term of
the United States Supreme Court. 3 An examination of the
Congressional Record for the past eleven years indicates that
this problem was never touched upon.6
One of the most immediate benefits to be obtained from a revised federal statute
would be the elimination of the necessity for many state statutes, which will be considered in the next paper of this series.

' That the judgments of the courts of the District of Columbia
are entitled to be enforced within the phrasing of R. S. 905 was decided by Embrey v Palmer, 107 U. S. 3 (1882) That they are to
receive full faith and credit when pleaded as a defense was settled
in Mills v Duryee, 7 Cranch 485 (1813). Whether or not the clause
is self-executing as to public acts of the states was settled by
A. T. & S. F Ry v Sowers, 213 U. S. 55 (1909) which case was
followed by El Paso & Northeastern Ry Co. v Gutierrez, Adm'r.,
215 U. S. 87 (1909), and Tennessee Coal, Iron and Railroad Co. v.
George, 233 U. S. 354 (1914)
'Morris v Jones, 67 S. Ct. 451 (Jan. 20, 1947), a 6-3 decision,
and Order of United Commercial Travelers v Wolfe, 67 S. Ct. 1355
(June 9, 1947) a 5-4 decision.
"Digest of Public General Bills With Index." Checked from
the 74th Congress, Second Session, to the date of adjournment of
the First Session of the Eightieth Congress, July 26, 1947.

